Abstract: Taking its cue from the observation that forms of aggressive humor directed against the political figure Donald Trump are not an ephemeral aspect of contemporary American politics but have been firmly embedded in American cultural discourse for more than two years, this article will explore the ways in which comedians, journalists and other contemporary observers have described and commented on the role and functions of humor and comedy with regard to the Trump phenomenon in the context of the 2016 presidential elections and its aftermath. Drawing on a selection of material from established online news resources the essay will document how popular media outlets have presented the nation's most prominent late-night comedy as an arena in which the format's popular hosts deploy humor in an attempt to undermine Trump's status and ultimately to end his foray onto America's highest political sphere. The article will then trace the popularity of the idea that political humor is subversive in the tradition of the country's intellectual history and check it against a selection of empirical studies devoted to the topic. In this context it will become apparent that the belief in the corrective power of humor is deeply ingrained in the American popular imagination and is being perpetuated by contemporary reports and comments in important segments of the media landscape.
When the initial shock of the 2016 presidential election subsided, a sizable spectrum of the American public began to look for ways to oppose Donald Trump and his political goals. It was a political impulse that resulted in "thousands of protest events organized over a wide range of issues" (Meyer and Tarrow 2018, 1) . In her speech on the occasion of the Women's March on Washington, civil rights legend and social activist Angela Davis said that " [t] he next 1,459 days of the Trump administration will be 1,459 days of resistance," and she announced that it would be an all-encompassing movement happening in the classrooms, on the job, "in our art and in our music" (Klein 2017, 204) . Singer Bruce Springsteen immediately joined the cause by telling his audience at a concert in Perth, Australia: "We are the new American resistance" (Kreps 2017 ). In the following months, American media outlets added the country's late-night hosts to the Resistance-to-Trump movement. Throughout 2017, late-night comedy was hailed as a major factor in the efforts of the opposition. Rolling Stone magazine explained "How Late-Night Hosts Became the Resistance," CNN's website featured Dean Obeidallah's account on how, in Trump's America, "comedians lead the resistance," and The Daily Beast called Stephen Colbert "Late Night's King of Trump Resistance," (Grove 2017; Grierson 2017; Obeidallah 2017) .
Taking its cue from the observation that forms of aggressive humor directed against the political figure Donald Trump are not an ephemeral aspect of contemporary American politics but have been firmly embedded in American cultural discourse for more than two years, this article will explore the ways in which comedians, journalists and other contemporary observers have described and commented on the role and functions of humor and comedy with regard to the Trump phenomenon in the context of the 2016 presidential elections and its aftermath. Drawing on a selection of material from established online news resources the essay will document how popular media outlets have presented the nation's most prominent late-night comedy as an arena in which the format's popular hosts deploy humor in an attempt to undermine Trump's status and ultimately to end his foray onto America's highest political sphere. The article will then trace the popularity of the idea that political humor is subversive in the tradition of the country's intellectual history and check it against a selection of empirical studies devoted to the topic. In this context it will become apparent that the belief in the corrective power of humor is deeply ingrained in the American popular imagination. By way of conclusion the insights of Christie Davies on the functions of humor in the political realm will serve to address the discrepancy between claims made for humor as a corrective force in politics and America's political reality of the election of Trump.
As soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was entering the race for the American presidency, his opponents mobilized a whole array of political strategies to thwart Trump's plans. One of the tactics employed was to attack the public image of the candidate by portraying him as a person who lacked the dignity and the character that is associated with the country's highest office. The way to achieve this was to ridicule his personal history, his behavior, and his outer appearance. This approach views humor through the lenses of superiority and aggression and was intended to damage a candidate's public standing and reputation. It represents a classic example of the type of humor that has been subsumed under superiority theory: its goal is the "attentive demolition of a person" (Scruton and Jones 1982, 209) . In the competitive atmosphere of a presidential election the motivation for such an approach is obvious. Given Trump's character, his manners, and his looks it seemed easy to find "some deformed thing" (Hobbes 1904, 34 ) that would provoke public laughter and thus disqualify him from consideration for the highest political honor in the United States.
In reading the media coverage, one can almost sense a feeling of euphoria among Trump's opponents: the anticipation of watching him bumble and blunder on the campaign trail and reveal his ignorance on national TV promised to be a hilarious spectacle that gave rise to Schadenfreude even before the fact. The excitement arising from an expected cornucopia of comedic opportunities was supplemented by the hope for commercial rewards. This is perhaps best illustrated by Les Moonves, then president and CEO of CBS, who encouraged Trump "to bring it on" because "this is so much fun" and "the money's rolling in" (Tomasky 2016 ). For many comedians there were good reasons to believe that a Trump candidacy would provide them with, as Seth Meyers, host of Late Night, put it in 2016, a "gift that keeps giving" (Helmore 2016) . After all, not only the city of New York, but America as a nation was well acquainted with the life story of Donald J. Trump, a man who had cultivated a reputation as a successful real estate tycoon, a public figure with a flamboyant lifestyle involving a series of highly visible romantic affairs, and a career as the host of the reality show The Apprentice. He relished the attention that his unconventional behavior brought him. Because his public appearances often seemed out of the ordinary the news media found it easy to ridicule the man and his manners.
When Trump entered the public stage to promote one of his projects or to engage publicly with issues emerging from his private life, his personal style was sure to create spicy newspaper copy and flashy headlines. Much of this media coverage was characterized by a tone of condescension that suggested that Trump was a person who, because of questionable and potentially illegal business decisions, his lack of taste and style, his hairstyle and his idiosyncratic behavior, could not be taken seriously. As early as the 1980's, Spy magazine had made Trump a target of derision when they referred to him as "short-fingered vulgarian" (Folkenflik 2016) . In 1999, conservative author and political satirist Christopher Buckley wrote an inaugural address for an imagined President Trump (Buckley 1999) which featured many of the characteristics that have now become routine elements in the mocking of Donald Trump. More than ten years later, comedian and actor Jerry Seinfeld opined that "all comedians love Donald Trump" and that Trump was "God's gift to comedy" ([THR staff] 2011 ). According to Kevin D. Williamson, author and correspondent for the conservative magazine National Review, Trump "was mainly known to the world as a tabloid cretin for many years" (Williamson 2015, 17) . Therefore, it comes as no surprise that American media outlets continued to portray him according to the established pattern as an attention-seeking buffoon. On June 17, 2015, the day after Trump descended the golden escalator in Trump Tower to announce that he would enter the presidential race, the New York Daily News printed the headline "Clown Runs for Prez" in bold letters over a photoshopped image of Trump showing him in clown makeup. In the accompanying article, the paper further exploited the imagery by saying that " [b] illionaire Donald Trump threw his red rubber nose into the ring" (Durkin and Edelman 2015) .
American comedians similarly felt that the arrival of Trump was giving them a treasure trove of material for their routines. One month after Trump declared his candidacy, CNN's website appropriated Seinfeld's phrase for an article entitled "Donald Trump: God's gift to comedy" by Jon Macks, a veteran comedy writer for Hollywood's top television programs. Macks explained that Trump's personality made him a perfect feature of any comedy show because he had a penchant for exaggeration and bragging, a habit of saying "anything without thinking and without being hampered by the facts," and an "unbridled stupidity." Comedians didn't even have to make an effort to ridicule him -"the man himself sometimes is the joke" (Macks 2015) . This assessment was echoed by veteran TV comedy writer and host Larry Wilmore who declared that with Trump's arrival on the political stage "[a]ll of the jokes write themselves" (Allen 2015) .
The proliferation of humorous and satiric commentary in the context of the 2016 presidential election in the United States is the latest manifestation of a long-standing tradition. Gerald Gardner, a former writer for a satirical television show and a staff member of Robert Kennedy's senatorial campaign (Welch 2016, 46) , observed that "every election year seems to lend itself to political humor." In 1992, the presidential campaign had a cast of protagonists whose personalities and political record stimulated "an outpouring of humor" (Gardner 1994, 11) . At that time and in the years to come, comedians working in a variety of genres across the entire media spectrum missed no opportunity to take aim at the pretensions and posturings of the actors involved in the political process. One particularly eye-catching comedy routine tailored to a high-profile target was Tina Fey's 2008 impersonation of Sarah Palin, the running mate of Republican presidential candidate John McCain, which portrayed Palin as an uninformed political lightweight. Fey's Palin impression on Saturday Night Live! drew so much public attention that it was credited with the complete demolition of whatever political and intellectual credentials the former governor of Alaska may have had. When Fey received the "Entertainer of the Year" award in 2008, commentators attributed the honor mainly to her "indelible impression" of Palin (Associated Press 2008). The impact was such that scholars and journalists began to write about the "Tina Fey effect," referring to the presumed influence of her comedy performance on the political fate of the Republican ticket (Sands 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2012 ). Similar observations have been made about the "SNL effect" (Kurtz 2008 ) and the "John Oliver effect" (Luckerson 2015) .
The perception of a subversive role of American political humor is not limited to the 20th and twenty-first centuries. As the historical record shows, previous centuries had their own political observers and commentators who chose humor as a tool to alert their audiences to the problems of the day, hoping to recruit them in their struggle to effect the desired improvements. Alison Olson identified early evidence of political humor during the time of American Revolution. Her investigation found that back then being laughed at was seen as "a humbling experience" (363). Executed in the public sphere, repeated thrusts of humor were supposed to undermine the reputation of government officials, their followers, and the institutions they represented. At the same time, Olson claimed that the act of ridiculing political frauds created a bond of solidarity among the group of laughers, and united them with a sense of shared values and with a sense of superiority.
With the territorial and political growth of the United States and the gradual emergence of a distinctive culture in the first half of the nineteenth century American humor became a graspable phenomenon. As this happened, political affairs remained high on the list of topics that enjoyed a popular appeal and provided material for political humor (Blair 1960, 39) . Especially the various political struggles of the time drew attention from writers who created humorous satires to attack social wrongs, to spread their humanistic positions, and to distribute advice for human betterment.
In the 1840s, James Russell Lowell created the Biglow Papers, a collection of poems and prose sketches dealing with the Mexican War and, in a second series, with the slavery issue that divided the nation. In these publications, Lowell satirized the folly and corruption of the politicians of the day together with their objectionable doctrines. With regard to their achievement, the Biglow Papers have been said to "take rank with greatness, and they were the strongest political tracts of their time" (Wortham 1982, 297) . Twenty years later, David Ross Locke, a man with a keen sense of political and social issues, published various books featuring the character Petroleum V. Nasby, a satirical figure designed to ridicule white supremacy and the racist ideology of the Southern cause (Minor 1982, 297) . The importance of the Nasby letters was summarized by George S. Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury in the Lincoln administration, when he attributed the final victory in the Civil War to the Northern military forces, the Republican Party, and the letters of PetroleumV. Nasby (Herzberg 1962, 780) .
As the nineteenth century came to an end, the United States was engaged in the Spanish-American war, a military engagement involving Cuba and the Philippines. As President McKinley explained, it was a mission to educate, "uplift and civilize and Christianize" the Filipinos (Carman et al. 1967, 298) . One of the most prominent literary voices that addressed the problem of imperialist ideology during the war was that of "Mr Dooley," the creation of Finley Peter Dunne, a Chicago newspaperman, editor, and humorist. The witty essays featuring "Mr Dooley," a philosophical barkeeper, enjoyed great popularity and had a considerable influence on the nation's opinion as the protagonist commented on a wide spectrum of political issues, ranging from municipal politics to America's imperial ambitions. Dunne's reputation and appeal rest firmly on his political satire work which "set a standard for later political humorists" (Goldstein 1988, 143) .
With the phrase "against the assault of laughter nothing can stand" from The Mysterious Stranger, Mark Twain, America's greatest humorist, both captured and further popularized the notion that humor is a powerful weapon. Although the text was not published until after the writer's death, American newspapers distributed the quote to a large readership all across the United States (Kersten 2018, 67) . The manuscript material which formed the basis for the book shows that Mark Twain was aiming at the political sphere when he identified religion, hereditary royalties, aristocracies, and all forms of governments as appropriate targets to be "blown to rags and atoms at a blast" by the use of laughter (Gibson 1969, 165) .
The political humor and the satirical edge of the literary writers was supplemented and enhanced by the illustrations which accompanied many of their books. Thomas Nast and Frederick Opper, who contributed funny drawings to Locke's and Dunne's books respectively, were popular artists whose reputation rested on the political character of their work. Nast's cartoons for Harper's Weekly were the first of their kind to reveal what an impact powerful imagery could have on American society (Lamb 2004, 43) . Nast felt strongly about the issues he addressed in his drawings and he was determined to use them to send clear messages to his audience. Charles G. Bush, a fellow cartoonist at Harper's, said that, to Nast, a cartoon was less a medium of humorous distraction but "a powerful weapon of good or evil" (Paine 1904, 581 ). Nast's work was also considered to be a major influence in the presidential election of 1868 when Ulysses S. Grant defeated Horatio Seymour. Grant himself paid tribute to Nast when he identified the two things that secured his election: "the sword of Sheridan and the pencil of Thomas Nast" (Paine 1904, 129) .
Much of the work that cartoonists produced was published in the nation's daily newspapers so that, by the end of the nineteenth century, they became the most important disseminators of political humor (Piott 1987, 54) . Having attracted the best and most popular cartoonists of the time for their massaudience newspapers, Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst delivered the humor of political cartoons "to every street corner newsstand" (53). In this way, cartoonists became important protagonists in the struggle for political goals and their work was easily accessible to everyone. Benjamin O. Flower, influential editor of the Arena magazine, described the cartoonist as "one of the greatest forces for good in the land -one of the most far-reaching and positive influences in the elementary education of hundreds of thousands if not millions of people" (Flower 1905a, 586) . Flower celebrated the work of the cartoonists as "a powerful […] opinion-forming influence and an important factor in the furtherance of moral integrity in business and political life, as well as a true educator of the people on questions that are of vital moment to them" (Flower 1906, 50) . In his assessment of Frederick Opper's work, Flower highlighted the artist's mission to alert "the American people to the essential criminality, oppression and peril to the public of the trusts, the privileged interests and the political allies by which they have been able to plunder the people" (Flower 1905a, 587) . Flower was also convinced that the work of these graphic artists had the potential to spur the readers into action. "He who sees [these cartoons] instinctively feels that henceforth he too must become a positive factor enlisted on the side of justice, of truth, of right" (Flower 1905b, 66) .
Nast and Opper are two representatives of a much larger group of cartoonists who, guided by a moral purpose, used their wit and their graphic talent to censure the political excesses of the late-19th and early twentieth centuries. Their art transformed political corruption, social inequality and other injustices into easily graspable and emblematic images. By arousing the public conscience they enabled their readership to "reclaim their usurped rights, their denied opportunities, and their besmirched character" and to restore the democratic spirit of the country (Piott 1987, 57) .
Scientists, scholars, and intellectuals shared the belief in the corrective power of humor held by the literary and graphic artists. William Mathews, professor of English at the university of Chicago, American essayist and author, declared that wit and humor were among America's "most precious possessions," "instruments of unquestionable good" (Mathews 1888, 92) . Their function was "to cheat misfortune, ennui, and melancholy of their sting." More importantly, they "protect society from rudeness, pretension, and charlatanism." In Mathews's eyes reason alone was not an effective weapon to fight against these evils, society also needed "[t]he light weapons of wit" (93). British scholar John Young Thomson Greig claimed that laughter had a transformative impact on people because it "is usually unpleasant to its object" and would therefore lead to "a change in the object." Greig contended that "few writers on the subject have failed to emphasize the corrective function laughter and comedy may exercise" (Greig 1923, 189) . Max Eastman, American essayist, historian, and author of two books about humor, also describes "derisive humor as a fine weapon" which can serve as a social corrective. His explanation for the reformatory effect is that people genuinely dislike to be laughed at because it generates a feeling of inferiority (Eastman 1921, 35) . The notion that humor and laughter are important tools in life was also entertained by people who were more practically and less philosophically minded. In his 1972 book Rules for Radicals, which is regarded as "one of the key references for community organizers today," activist Saul Alinsky identifies humor as "essential to a successful tactician". The "most potent weapons known to mankind," he wrote in his book, "are satire and ridicule" (Alinsky 1971, 75) . Gerald Gardner calls humor "the most essential element in a democracy." In his view, it can be both a tool of persuasion and a "wounding weapon" which is why it "is considered subversive by the powers that be" (Gardner 1994, 12) . Drawing on his experience with politicians in Washington, Gardner believes that humorous routines actually have an impact on political figures: "[W]hen a presidential candidate becomes the object of the rapier wit of columnists, cartoonists, and comedians […] he is less ready to ignore his own deficiencies" (13-14).
The previous section provides a brief survey showing the persistence of a belief in the subversive power of humor, a characteristic which allows people to confront political authority, reveal and address its foibles and thus exert a form of control over political power. Most of the ideas expressed in the paragraphs above come from journalists, writers, artists and activists. They are the result of personal observation, active involvement, intensive reflection, and serious intellectual engagement with the issues at hand. These insights can be supplemented with the work of scholars in the fields of humor research, media studies, sociology, and psychology, many of whom have attempted to put the issue on an empirical footing by examining quantitative effects. Due to the limited space available here the following brief remarks will be kept within the confines of a few characteristic studies.
Generally speaking, one branch of empirical research has tended to support the notion that humor can indeed function as an oppositional force. Smith (1993) declares that humor helps common people "to challenge the dominant view of the social order." Olsen (quoted in Smith 51) specifies that" [t]he comic vision loves to pull the rug out from under […] affected dignity, silly pedantry, absurd pride, willfulness, and other human follies" (51). Marjolein 't Hart asserts that "[h]umour and laughter can serve as a powerful tool in social protest" (Hart 2007, 1) . She concedes, however, that "humour itself never changes circumstances" (7) and that it is incapable of modifying political structures by itself. In their 2008 investigation of the impact of the political segments of The Daily Show, Baumgartner and Morris report that the findings of their study show that "exposure to The Daily Show's brand of political humor influenced young Americans by lowering support for both presidential candidates and increasing cynicism" (Baumgartner and Morris 2016, 361) . The effect that they observed is less pronounced with regard to an individual candidate but relates to the political process as a whole and might lead to further alienation and disenchantment among (young) voters. Sørensen (2013) , in her investigation on the effectiveness of political stunts (i.e. performances or actions carried out to confront the perspective of those in power), concludes that activities of this type have the potential to undermine power. But she is careful to add that this does not mean that all political humor can be regarded as truly subversive (81) Stephen Colbert provide material for viewers "to make judgments about the candidates, their authenticity, and their personal characteristics" (561). Their study also showed that politicians understood that comedy programs had an impact on how viewers saw them as candidates. Baumgartner's (2013) research on humor's potential to change existing attitudes draws on a body of earlier research from the fields of communication, marketing, and psychology. His conclusion is that "humor's power to persuade is, at best, minimal" (Baumgartner 2013, 24) . But in more recent studies he also found evidence for the view that "political humor may have direct, message-consistent effects on political attitudes" and thus has the potential to lower evaluations of the target of the humor (24). Ultimately, Baumgartner feels confident to state that political humor can indeed have an adverse impact on political trust and induce higher levels of political cynicism (25). This position is consistent with his earlier project in which he and his colleagues attempted to determine whether or not Tina Fey's impersonation of Sarah Palin had an effect on the 2008 election. Although their study remains inconclusive, the researchers nevertheless hold on to the notion that "political comedy can move opinion in a message-or caricature-consistent direction" (96). Boukes et al. (2015) , in their study on how "political satire affects political attitudes" attempt to refine earlier research by drawing attention to the fact that comedy routines need to be transparent to an audience. They conclude that "[a]s long as satirists primarily aim to be funny and provide sufficient cues to be perceived as jokesters," it is very unlikely that "political satire [could] bring down societal power structures" (741). In their study of the 2016 presidential primaries, Nitz et al. (2017) examine the humor employed in a selection of late-night shows. They posit that "late-night comedy talk shows are instrumental in the role of society 's perceptions of political candidates" (Nitz et al. 2017, 103) and that talk-show hosts, who control the format and the direction of an interview, exercise a more important role in the scrutiny of a candidate than traditional journalists (104). The researchers identify a form of political humor that is characterized by a negative tone and an emphasis on the weaknesses of the candidates. This, they believe, has "a negative impact on the political attitudes and opinions of viewers" (105). In their conclusion, the authors phrase their insights carefully: In agreement with previous studies, they acknowledge that understanding the political impact of comedy is a complex issue. Therefore, they restrict themselves to stating that "[h]umor could outrage a voter to the extent that they do not vote or they vote against a candidate" and "humor could reinforce or support voters' pre-established frames, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of political humor" (119) [my emphasis]. Despite this careful wording, Nitz and colleagues end their essay with the statement that humor is "effective at laughing politicians off the stage." It is a strong commitment to the notion that humor is "a powerful force in American politics" (119).
The above-listed positions, expressed over the course of almost two hundred years by a variety of highly qualified observers, convey a fairly consistent view of the power that is associated with political humor. From colonial times to the present there is a common thread asserting that the psychological impact of subversive humor can weaken and even defeat individuals seeking political office. Empirical studies have tried to identify and analyze the components of political comedy to arrive at a better understanding of how the process functions and have confirmed, albeit with appropriate caution, that humor does have the potential to exert influence in the political sphere. In view of a substantial number of qualitative and quantitative publications all asserting and validating the potentially corrective function of political humor, the outcome of the 2016 election campaign leaves observers of political humor struggling to understand how the individual who has been called "the most ridiculed presidential candidate in the history of late-night television talk shows" (Farnsworth et al. 2017) was able to defeat an opponent with significantly more qualifications and government experience. The following section documents in condensed form how the failure of the "laugh resistance" (Steinberg 2018 ) registered with some of its prominent members. The evidence assembled here shows that the protagonists and participants in the anti-Trump humor effort were dumbfounded that the entire humor arsenal deployed to blast him as a ridiculous individual had failed to demolish his status and authority and keep him from the presidency.
It is perhaps useful to begin with a noteworthy moment which, at the time, seemed to illustrate the power of ridicule: In his performance at the 2011 White House Correspondents' Dinner President Obama mocked Donald Trump in retaliation for the real-estate mogul's "birther" stance (Perone 2011) . It was an occasion on which, in the words of New Yorker staff writer Adam Gopnik, "the President took apart Donald Trump, plastic piece by orange part, and then refused to put him back together again" (Gopnik 2015) . But what looks as if Obama as comedian had thoroughly humiliated Trump may in fact have had the opposite effect and spurred the supposed victim on to run for the presidency, redeem himself, and "stop those who laughed at him" (Haberman 2016) .
When Trump did decide to become a candidate, it set off a relentless barrage of satirical attacks on the man and his ideas. It might be only a slight exaggeration to say that since then there has not been a single show in late-night comedy in which Stephen Colbert, Seth Myers, Trevor Noah, John Oliver, Samantha Bee and others have not torn into the political actions or the personal affairs of the New York billionaire businessman -but ultimately none of their efforts prevented Trump's ascendancy to the White House.
On election night, the supposed power of humor seemed to evaporate. In view of the inescapable truth that Trump was on the verge of a victory, Stephen Colbert lost his ability to perform as a late-night comedian. "I can't put a happy face on that, and that's my job," he said and scrambled to find his composure amidst awkward pauses, deep breaths, and attempts at gallows humor (Itzkoff 2016) . When the fact of the Trump victory sank in, comedians were struggling to define their mission. For what might be obvious reasons, there was nobody who attempted to make a case for the corrective power of humor. Seth Meyers choked up as he delivered his lines the day after the election (" [SFC] " 2016) and for Trevor Noah, telling his audience that they might not have come to "the right place for jokes tonight," it felt "like the end of the world" (Hoffmann 2016) . Director Judd Apatow, a man with several successful movie comedies to his credit, felt that after the election the situation was similar to that in a church, or at a funeral -humor would be totally out of place: "One thing I do not want to watch right now," he tweeted, "is comedy about any of this. That's how terrifying and disappointing this is" (E.W. 2016).
Although a writer for the Economist website repeated the idea that "[c]omedy can be an important medium for political resistance," his article also explained to his readers that the effects of humor are ambiguous and difficult to predict. He felt that the relentless mockery might ultimately have benefited Trump. Satirizing Donald Trump on television, the writer believed, was one component in "the fusion of entertainment and politics [that] made his rise possible in the first place" (E.W. 2016) because it had enhanced his TV presence even further.
After the experience of seeing Trump win despite all efforts to ridicule the man and his program, the objective changed: Now "they're all striving to find the comedy in even the bleakest of situations to help people go to bed with smiles on their faces" (McFarland 2017) . That, however, is an example of humor as a coping and defense mechanism, not as a powerful offensive weapon.
Slate magazine's Andrew Kahn singled out the Saturday Night Live! show in which Kate McKinnon performed as Hillary Clinton and sang selections from Leonard Cohen's "Hallelujah" as a symbolical "act of cultural surrender": "It seemed to be saying that comedy had failed us," he wrote. "There was no longer any use in trying to be funny, no potential in it, no need to keep up the charade of satire" (Kahn 2016 ). On election night, comedians, fans of political comedy, and Trump opponents learned the hard way that no matter how appealing the idea of humor as a corrective force might appear to them, it did not live up to reality, at least not in the way of preventing a Trump presidency.
This shock of recognition might have been less intense if the skeptical view of the powers of humor had been as well rooted in the public mind as its optimistic counterpart. Objections to the notion that humor was a force for good go back at least as far as Rousseau who, in his reflections on the subject, insisted that the effects of comedy are "disastrous for morals" (Rousseau 1960, 34) . The wars and atrocities of the twentieth century did their share to undermine the idea of humor as a relevant factor in political life. British comedian Peter Cook is on record for praising, satirically, "those wonderful Berlin cabarets […] which did so much to stop the rise of Hitler and prevent the outbreak of the second world war" (Williams 2016 ). In the United States, attempts to use mockery to confront and push back the Ku Klux Klan turned out to be unsuccessful. Popular humorist Don Marquis and the satirical cartoonists Rollin Kirby, Jefferson Machamer as well as Black artists Wilbert Holloway and Jay Jackson produced texts and images designed to ridicule the racist group. It turned out, however, that these initiatives were ineffective at stopping the growing Klan movement because the organization proved to be immune to this sort of opposition (Harcourt 2017, 17) . These examples illustrate that an unmitigated faith in humor as an antidote to undesirable, or dangerous, political developments is not warranted. They suggest that humor may ultimately be a less efficient tool of social and political control than is assumed by the general public.
As a matter of fact, another branch of researchers can be cited to support the skepticism that emerges from the examples above. In his 2013 survey of relevant studies in the field, Holbert stated that the consumption of political satire had almost no effect on the acquisition of political knowledge (Holbert 2013, 311) . He also wrote that "the persuasive effects of political satire appear to be minimal" (310), thus calling into question the possibility that humor deserves to be regarded as a serious tool of political intervention. Similarly, Young, in her contribution to the 2017 Oxford Handbook of Political Communication, condensed the current state of research thus: "At present, political humor's impact on knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors is far from clear" (Young 2017, 879) .
The most determined and sustained rejection of the view that wit could be a weapon, or humor an effective political strategy, can be found in the prolific writings of Christie Davies. Based on his extensive and detailed examination of jokes and joke cycles from a wide range of countries, Davies conducted his analysis on the basis of information from social, economic, and historical studies. He rejects "processing texts through a mess of speculative assumptions rooted in an untestable cultural theory" and requires that statements about the role of humor be based on "well-founded empirical knowledge of the real world" (Davies 2011, 17) . In his chapter on the Soviet joke, a keystone in his argument against the power of humor, he emphasizes that jokes had nothing to do with the demise of the Soviet Union because "jokes are a very, very weak force in a world of much stronger forces" (246). His meticulous research allows him to be unequivocal about his findings. Although he does leave some room for the possibility that, under the right circumstances, certain forms of humor might have "a small social or political effect," he is clear about the larger picture: "Jokes have no consequences for society as a whole" (266). He emphatically rejects what he sees as "a foolish sentimental myth," namely "that an entire oppressive political system could be brought down by humor" (246). While jokes do reveal insights into the failures of the social and political order, Davies still characterizes them as "entertainment only" (267). Jokes do not work like a thermostat which can be operated to control the temperature. Rather, Davies holds, jokes are like a thermometer, "they provide an indication of what is happening in a society, but they do not […] change or reinforce the social processes that generated them in any important way" (248). Read in the context of the failure of American late-night comedy to prevent Donald Trump from winning the presidency, Davies's insistence on the limitations of humor's political force provides a frame of reference to help resolve the discrepancy between the ambitious claims of the "laugh resistance" and the negligible impact it had at a crucial moment in the history of American political life.
The work by Holbert, Young, and Davies has been introduced here to illustrate what is missing from the popular discussion of political humor. No articles have been found that content themselves with regarding humor about Trump simply as a symptom of the unexpected rise of a provocative figure. Humor might be credited with sublimating aggression and providing relief for a serious feeling of frustration and disappointment. But it appears that journalists and other commentators were looking for more than something therapeutic. Even the realization that more than two years of almost uninterrupted humorous assaults on Trump the candidate and the president have brought about no tangible political effect, has not resulted in the overthrow or a revision of what appears to be a deeply ingrained belief. Not only have the major late-night comedians kept up their usual routines, the audience for such programs has actually grown. As Josef Adalian reported on Vulture, the arrival of Trump in the White House has created larger audiences for Stephen Colbert, Samantha Bee, Trevor Noah, and Bill Maher, perhaps the four hosts who are most aggressive in their approach to Trump (Adalian 2017a , Adalian 2017b . It almost seems as if late-night audiences harbor, in the words of Christie Davies, "a primitive belief in the magical power of words, the belief that even to utter certain jokes, regardless of situation or context, might cause total social destruction" (268). In a world in which scholars have come to "fundamentally different conclusions about satire's role in a democratic society" (Young 2017, 878) , the popular mind holds on to what may be wishful thinking or a desperate hope, namely to the appealing notion that humor is some kind of magical tool that can bring about desired results without requiring active political engagement.
